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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Randolph Mark Snowball, a.k.a. Mark C. Snowball, appeals from the summary 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Snowball filed his petition for post-
conviction relief one day after the statute of limitation had run. Mr. Snowball alleged 
that the time for filing his petition should be tolled because he brought a claim of actual 
innocence. The district court dismissed the petition because no Idaho court had yet 
adopted such a ground for tolling. He requests that this Court adopt such a ground and 
hold that Mr. Snowball's allegations survive summary dismissal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2008, Mr. Snowball was found guilty of intimidating a witness. (R., pp.4-5.) 
He appealed, and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished 
opinion. (R., p.5.) The remittitur was issued on February 14, 2010. (R., p.5.) 
On February 15, 2011, Mr. Snowball filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
(R., p.4.) His first claim was actual innocence; his second claim was a Crawford1 
violation; and his third claim was ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Snowball 
attached two affidavits to his petition, one from Andrew Wolf, and one from Whitnee 
Snowball. 2 
According to Mr. Wolf, on September 23, 2007, he was housed in the Ada 
County Jail with Mr. Snowball and another inmate. (R., p.9.) Mr. Snowball told them 
1 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 Ms. Snowball and Ms. Ward are the same person. 
1 
that his girlfriend, Whitnee Ward, had filed false charges of domestic battery against him 
after they had a verbal disagreement. (R., p.9.) Mr. Snowball stated that he wanted 
Ms. Ward to come forward and tell the truth, but Ms. Ward was hesitant to admit that 
she had lied to the police. (R., p.'10.) Mr. Wolf stated that he had witnessed 
Mr. Snowball receive several letters from Ms. Ward which contained exculpatory 
information and that Ms. Ward visited Mr. Snowball several times despite the presence 
of a no-contact order. (R. p.10.) According to Mr. Wolf, Mr. Snowball told him that 
Ms. Ward had asked Mr. Snowball to find out how she could avoid coming to court 
because she did not want to admit that she lied to the police. (R., p.10.) Ms. Ward told 
Mr. Snowball that she felt coerced by the prosecutor and stopped returning her calls. 
(R., p.10.) Mr. Snowball sought Mr. Wolf and the other inmate's assistance in writing a 
letter that responded to Ms. Ward's questions, but still encouraged her to tell the truth. 
(R., p.10.) Mr. Wolf believed that Mr. Snowball's intent in sending the letter was to 
answer Ms. \/'-Jard's questions and to tell the truth. (R., p.10.) Mr. Wolf did not believe 
that Mr. Snowball had attempted to intimidate Ms. Ward. (R., p.10.) Mr. Wolf had never 
been interviewed by anyone regarding Mr. Snowball's letter. (R., p.11.) 
In Ms. Snowball's affidavit, she confirmed that she filed a false report of domestic 
battery and at the time was under the influence of alcohol and medication. (R., p.12.) 
She admitted that, although there was a no-contact order with her and Mr. Snowball, 
she visited Mr. Snowball several times at the jail by using her sister's identification card. 
(R., p.13.) She stated that she had read the letter that lead to Mr. Snowball's charges 
for intimidating a witness and that everything in the letter was information that she 
requested from Mr. Snowball during her visits at the jail. (R., p.13.) She believed that 
2 
Mr. Snowball was innocent of the crime and was only attempting to answer her 
questions, not influence her testimony. (R., p.13.) 
Mr. Snowball subsequently filed his own affidavit in which he too asserted that he 
only sent the letter because Ms. Snowball specifically inquired about the information 
and "did not attempt to intimidate, impede, deter, threaten, harass, obstruct, or prevent 
Whitnee from testifying freely, fully, and truthfully in the underlying domestic battery 
case." (R., p.32.) 
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, asserting that the petition was 
untimely. (R., p.36.) Mr. Snowball responded, asserting that the time period for filing 
his petition should be tolled because he asserted a claim of actual innocence. 
(R., pp.41, 43.) 
The district court summarily dismissed the petition. Regarding the claim of actual 
innocence, the court doubted that Mr. Snowball's new evidence would demonstrate his 
innocence. (R., p.51.) However, the court specifically did not dismiss on this ground; 
rather, the court dismissed the petition because Idaho has yet to adopt actual innocence 
as a ground for tolling. (R., p.51.) The district court stated: 
In this case Mr. Snowball argues the new affidavits he has submitted with 
his petition coupled with his argument regarding his constitutional right to 
confront witnesses under Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004), 
make this showing such that the Idaho statutory deadline for submitting 
his UPCPA petition should be tolled. The court has reviewed the affidavits 
of Mark Snowball and Whitnee Snowball. The court is not convinced that 
any juror acting reasonably and considering the testimony in these new 
affidavits could not still find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Nevertheless, this Court does not reject his actual innocence argument on 
that basis. Because actual innocence has not been established as a tolling 
exception by Idaho courts the trial court will not create it here. 
3 
(R., p.51.) The court then issued a final judgment dismissing the petition. (R., p.54.) 
Mr. Snowball appealed. (R., p.65.) He requests that this Court adopt actual innocence 
as a ground for tolling the statute of limitation for a petition for post-conviction relief. 
4 
ISSUE 
Should this Court adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling the statute of limitation 
for filing a petition for post-conviction relief? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Ado t Actual Innocence As A Ground For Tolling The Statute Of 
Limitation For Filing A Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
The sole ground for dismissing the petition, as it relates to actual innocence, was 
that Idaho had yet to adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling the statute of 
limitation. (R. p.51.) Mr. Snowball requests that this Court adopt actual innocence as a 
ground for tolling and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
8. This Court Should Adopt Actual Innocence As A Ground For Tolling The Statute 
Of Limitation For Filing A Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249-51 (2009). 
However, "[t]he 'application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of 
the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1)."' State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548, 560 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct App. 2002)). 
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561(citing I.C. § 
19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Id. 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction petition without an evidentiary 
hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will 
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
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Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 
76, 80 (2002)). This standard applies equally to questions regarding the accrual of 
actions and the passage of the statute of limitations. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 
249-51 (2009)(citing Harris v. State, ex rel. Kempthome, 147 Idaho 401, 405 (2009)). 
Mr. Snowball does not dispute that his petition was untimely by one day. 
(Tr., p.29, Ls.1-11.) However, he asserts that his claim of actual innocence should 
survive by virtue of equitable tolling. In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts 
from considering "claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the time 
limit, yet raise important due process issues." Id. at 904. 
In Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in instances of a Brady 
violation, "there may be a tolling of the one year statute of limitations until discovery of 
the Brady violation." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904. The Court of Appeals has applied 
equitable tolling in two other circumstances: "(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated 
in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access 
to Idaho legal materials; (2) and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication 
renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing 
challenges to his conviction." Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960 (Ct.App.2003). The 
Idaho Supreme Court subsequently adopted these two grounds for tolling. Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 247, 251 (2009). 
In Rhoades, the petitioner asserted a claim of actual innocence in a successive petition 
for post-conviction relief. Id. at 252-53. The Court determined, "[w]e need not and do 
not decide today whether due process requires a free-standing actual innocence 
7 
exception to the application of I.C. § 19-4902." Id. at 253. This was because the Court 
ultimately concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the test for actual innocence. The 
Court stated that the standard is, "as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Schlup v. Delo, 'the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence."' Id. (citing 
Schlup v. Delo. 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). The Rhoades Court found that the 
information supplied by the petition did not cast doubt over the petitioner's guilt, and 
thus, "conclude[d] that Rhoades had failed to establish a prima facie case of actual 
innocence." Id. 
Schlup actually involved not a free-standing actual innocence exception, but 
rather, '·was addressing a showing required for a federal habeas petitioner to avoid a 
procedural bar to the consideration of his constitutional claims." Fields v. State, 151 
Idaho 18, 22(2011 ). In Fields, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in Schlup, the United 
States Supreme Court, "was not setting forth a requirement applicable to state claims 
for post-conviction relief." Id. The Court thus held that Schlup was inapplicable to that 
case, whether the petitioner brought a claim of innocence pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4901 (a)(6), which requires that a petitioner demonstrate, "in light of all admissible 
evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who committed the offense." Id. 
Mr. Snowball assets, however, that the Schlup standard should be applied to his 
case. Unlike the petitioner in Fields supra, Mr. Snowball is not asserting a claim of 
innocence based on fingerprint or DNA test results, and thus, the standard set forth in 
the statute, that the petitioner prove that he is not the person who committed the 
offense, is not applicable. Rather, the test should be, as adopted in Rhoades, that, "the 
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petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted him in light of the new evidence." 
Mr. Snowball submits that he meets this test. In the affidavits submitted in 
support of the petition, Andrew Wolfs stated that he had witnessed Mr. Snowball 
received several letters from Ms. Snowball which contained exculpatory information and 
had witnessed Ms. Snowball visiting Mr. Snowball several times in violation of a no-
contact order. (R., p.10.) According to Mr. Wolfe, Mr. Snowball told him that 
Ms. Snowball had asked him to find out how she could avoid coming to court because 
she did not want to admit that she had lied to the police. (R., p.10.) Mr. Snowball then 
sought Mr. Wolf's and another inmate's assistance in writing a letter that responded to 
Ms. Snowball's questions, but still encouraged her to tell the truth. (R., p.10.) Mr. Wolf 
believed that Mr. Snowball's intent in sending the letter was not answer Ms. Snowball's 
questions and to tell her to tell the truth, not try to intimidate her. (R., p.10.) 
In Ms. Snowball's affidavit, she confirmed that she filed a false report of domestic 
battery and at the time was under the influence of alcohol and other medication. 
(R., p.12.) She admitted that, although there was a no-contact order between her and 
Mr. Snowball, she visited Mr. Snowball several times at the jail by using her sister's 
identification card. (R., p.13.) She stated that she had read the letter that lead to 
Mr. Snowball's charges for intimidating a witness and that everything in the letter was 
information that she requested from Mr. Snowball during her visits at the jail. (R., p.13.) 
Thus, Ms. Snowball believed that Mr. Snowball was innocent and was not seeking to 
influence her testimony. (R., p.13.) 
9 
Mr. Snowball's affidavit likewise asserted that he was visited by Ms. Snowball at 
the jail and that the letter was merely a response to her questions and was not an 
attempt to influence her testimony. (R., p.32.) Thus, Mr. Snowball asserts that he 
established a prima facie showing of actual innocence because there was a non-
criminal reason to send the letter. 
Finally, Mr. Snowball asserts that this Court should toll the statute of limitation to 
this claim. In Rhoades, the petitioner asserted that a claim of actual innocence provided 
a basis for tolling. The Court determined, "[w]e need not and do not decide today 
whether due process requires a free-standing actual innocence exception to the 
application of !.C. § 19-4902." Rhoades, ·14s Idaho at 253. This was because the court 
concluded that the petitioner had not satisfied the test for innocence. Id. This Court 
should now hold that a claim of innocence tolls the statute of limitations. 
Federal courts have "equitable discretion to hear the merits of procedurally-
defaulted habeas claims where the failure to do so would result in a 'fundamental 
miscarriage of justice,' such as the conviction of an actually innocent person." Lee v. 
Lamperl, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Mccleskey v. Zant, 499 US. 467, 502 
(1991 )). An actual innocence exception, "serves as 'an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty,' guaranteeing 
that the ends of justice will be served in full." Id. (citing McC/eskey, 499 U.S. at 495.) 
In the context of using actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the 
consideration of constitutional claims, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, "[w]e must be 
vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the name of judicial 
efficiency." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647 (2000). Mr. Snowball acknowledges that 
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Sivak did not deal with a free-standing claim of actual innocence. However, the 
concerns are the same. Mr. Snowball asserts that an injustice occurs when a person 
who can demonstrate his innocence is barred from litigating that claim simply because 
he filed his petition a day late. Strict application of the statute of limitations would 
therefore work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency in Mr. Snowball's case. Thus, 
he asserts that this Court should equitably toll free-standing claims of actual innocence 
and permit Mr. Snowball to litigate his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Snowball requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this th day of February, 2013. 
JUSTIN M'. CURTIS 
Deputy S,tate Appellate Public Defender 
,~ 
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